In the simulation results reported in Section 4 we noted attenuation towards zero of the vessel and selling company regression estimates when frailty was ignored, but no apparent attenuation for buying company coefficients. We will briefly investigate.
For simplicity we assume no vessel or exogenous covariates and a single time-constant binary company covariate X C . We use vessel age as the only time scale, in effect assuming that all vessels are delivered at the same calendar time. We assume that all companies are active throughout the observation period, that there is no scrapping and that all vessels are monitored, and can potentially be sold, up to age τ . Hence there are no calendar time effects and no selection effects due to vessels being observed or not. Interest is in the selling company and buying company regression coefficients β S and β B .
We consider three scenarios.
1. Sales are driven only by the selling company covariate and frailty. The transition intensity for a sale of vessel v at age a from its owning company s(a, v) to another company b is
2. Sales are driven by the frailty and covariate of the buying company only. The intensity is
3. Characteristics of both the selling and buying companies affect the sales intensity:
The simulation results in Table 1 support the suggestion in Section 4 that the coefficient β S associated with the selling company is attenuated when frailty is ignored, whereas the coefficient β B associated with the buying company is not. In other simulations (not shown) we found the vessel-level regression coefficients are also attenuated under ignored frailty.
To explore a little, we consider estimation when both the number of vessels K and the number of companies N increase, not necessarily at same rate. Using similar methods to those of Henderson & Oman (1999) , the estimatorŝ β B andβ S can be shown to converge to so-called least-false values β * B and β * S respectively. These values are the solutions to the limiting score equations, with suitable scaling. We will concentrate first on Scenario 3, for which the limiting score equations are
for β S . Here Z s(a) and X C s(a) are the frailty and covariate for the company owning a randomly chosen vessel at age a, and Z b and X C b are the frailty and covariate for the buying company. The expectations are over the distributions of vessels and companies in place at age/time a.
First consider (1). Noting that the company distribution is time-constant in our scenarios and that the selling company is independent of the buying company, we can simplify to
Further, frailty Z b is independent of X C b by assumption, and so (1) is equivalent to
This is solved at β * B = β B , the true value. Hence we expect consistent estimation of β B in Scenario 3. Intuitively, the reason is that there is no selection effect that affects the buy-side of a transaction. All companies other than the seller are always potential buyers and their covariates and frailties are fixed. Hence we can factorise the limiting score as (3) and solve for β * B without considering the time-varying terms. The same can be shown for Scenario 2 and, for completeness, we can also show consistent estimation of β B = 0 in Scenario 1.
The situation is different when we turn to estimating the coefficients β S associated with selling. In (2), the terms involving the buying company are time-constant and independent of the selling company. Hence they can be factored out and the limiting score equation becomes
Now the expectations involving the parameters of interest are not time-constant: we have a selection effect which does not apply to vessels directly, but rather to the companies owning vessels. Intuitively, as age a increases the distributions of Z s(a) and β S X C s(a) will become concentrated on values that are associated with low intensity of sales. As covariates are both observed and conditioned on, the change in distribution of covariates is correctly handled in the estimation process. The difficulty of course is that frailty is not observed and has been ignored in our estimation process. Attenuation might therefore be expected just as for standard survival analysis when frailty is ignored (Henderson & Oman 1999) .
A difference is that for every sale there is a buyer in our transactions situation. Under our model we expect companies which have low intensity for sales to have high intensity for buying, after adjustment for covariates. Consequently we might expect the selection effects to stabilise once an equilibrium
